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_______________________________________________ 
Post-conflict peacebuilding is failing, according to both its critics and its advocates. By way of 
solutions, proponents seek more of the same, whereas opponents argue for a radical shift. 
Both contain parts of a possible solution to the lack of local legitimacy that stigmatizes 
interventions, many of which descend into violence within five years and few of which produce 
democracies. This article advances the idea of a ‘popular peace’ that refocuses liberal 
institution building upon local, democratically-determined priorities deriving from ‘everyday 
lives’, in addition to internationally-favoured preferences (such as metropolitan courts and 
bureaucratic government). This is hypothesized to better confront the prevailing legitimacy 
lacuna, create social institutions around which a contract can evolve, and generate the 
foundations upon which durable peacebuilding may grow. 
_____________________________________________________ 
 
Changes in the axis of security with which Western academic discourse is concerned have 
forced frequent rethinking regarding sources of insecurity for the ‘global north’. These 
changes have been accompanied by the movement of various security matters within and 
between academic disciplines, reflecting the importance with which they are viewed in 
academia. The question of how to build peace after war – peacebuilding – was once marginal 
to mainstream security debates. It now occupies a central position in the International 
Relations literature. Its relevance to the liberal peace notion has seen peacebuilding take 
centre stage in security debates and it is presently advanced as a means to achieve both 
local and international security. The approach, however, is increasingly under fire. Critics 
interrogate the nature and limits of the peace.1 They detect the hegemonic model’s 
ontological narrowness;2 challenge the methodologies involved;3 note the diminution of the 
local in contemporary peacebuilding;4 and explain the failure of liberal institutionalism in terms 
of its questionable relevance to, and legitimacy for, substantial groups of the population in 
post-conflict spaces.5  
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Advocates of the liberal orthodoxy concede that the Liberal Project, as Tom Young 
called it,6 is not securing the south for local or northern rationales. Their solution, however, 
involves refining the prevailing approach using the same methodologies based on the same 
ontological assumptions.7 They propose advanced technical solutions to deal with political 
matters. Its imaginary can be summarized as more of the same, ordered differently and more 
firmly applied. In response critics contend that this continues to ignore foundational, 
ontological and methodological matters and still lacks a radical, let alone inspired, vision of 
what peacebuilding might involve.8  Increasingly, critics point to the lack of local legitimacy as 
the key to understanding why peace does not prevail as intended.9 Orthodox peacebuilding is 
legitimated from without by its emphasis on state-centric liberalism but, according to critics,  
delegitimized within because peacebuilding priorities are irrelevant to much of the 
population’s imminent needs.10 Priorities are not designed domestically and do not privilege 
the institutions locals would favour to deliver their needs. There is validity in these claims: 
whilst the process claims to be democratic and inclusive, local people are included primarily in 
the technical moment of elections. The process lacks any means of deliberation and dialogue 
to render inclusion and participation sufficiently meaningful to generate local legitimacy.11  
This article is concerned with how peacebuilding can be made more relevant and 
legitimate to the people who must sanction the state-centrism that liberal peacebuilding 
prioritizes. It argues that the legitimacy upon which peacebuilding, states and peace rest 
cannot be generated by building institutions that ignore a population’s priorities and imminent 
needs and which are irrelevant to conditions and contingencies as severe as those that 
routinely define post-conflict spaces. There is little evidence that new or rebuilt states identify 
and deliver those public priorities; so the state cannot acquire the broad legitimacy upon 
which its authority depends. This paradox is aggravated by international policy that denies 
state subsidization of collective needs, and by neglecting and aggravating the absence of a 
social contract. The article argues that the provision of local needs is central to generating 
internal, local legitimacy, which in turn is a key to stability and peace. The article first explains 
the idea of ‘the everyday’ and then examines how this could inform and structure a ‘popular 
peace’ served by global governance in accordance with core liberal values. It considers the 
peace people might ask for, rather than the peace interventionists believe they should have. 
 
The Everyday 
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Peacebuilding literature is increasingly informed by the notion of the ‘everyday’. Phillip Darby 
suggests that academics and researchers ‘need to go out into the world and to connect with 
the everyday’, adding that that ‘there are steps that can be taken to encourage ordinary 
people on both sides of the North–South divide to become more involved in shaping the 
climate of thinking about peace settlements’.12 Numerous others, including this author, have 
implicitly or explicitly advanced this notion, to varying degrees, in terms of indigenous 
approaches to peace.13 Necessarily, in their engagement with local people researchers have 
to engage with the everyday lived lives of those people. But what is meant by ‘everyday life’?  
Michel de Certeau wrote that ‘everyday life’ is made up of ‘the innumerable practices 
by means of which users reappropriate the space organized by techniques of sociocultural 
organization’, whether that ‘sociocultural organization’ derives from local government or global 
governance. For de Certeau, this equates to the ‘surreptitious reorganization of power’.14 
Boege et al. write that such practices involve: ‘[c]ustomary law, traditional societal structures 
(extended families, clans, tribes, religious brotherhoods, village communities) and traditional 
authorities (such as village elders, headmen, clan chiefs, healers, bigmen, religious leaders)’, 
in determining ‘the everyday social reality of large parts of the population in developing 
countries... particularly in rural and remote peripheral areas’.15 Inevitably, ‘the everyday’ is 
concerned with a broader imagining of security, one that stands at odds with the idea of 
security privileged in peacebuilding. The latter is concerned with securing the state by 
allocating to it the sole legitimate use of violence, in Weberian, liberal fashion. But in the 
extreme conditions of post-conflict spaces, ‘the everyday’ is concerned with matters that 
secure the individual from routine, day-to-day contingencies unfamiliar to most international 
policymakers in the field of peacebuilding.  
Such threats to everyday life commonly involve the war-aggravated poverty that strips 
clothing from people’s backs, destroys their shelter and excludes from their lives basic 
nutrition, jobs and access to clean water. Combined, these contingencies kill people, or 
render them destitute, poverty-stricken, ill, illiterate and vulnerable to abuse. Their personal 
spaces are sometimes partly secured from direct violence by peacebuilding priorities such as 
security sector reform, but peacebuilding does little to nourish the everyday practices people 
deploy to secure themselves from the pervasive threats of indirect violence that are not the 
subject of statebuilding and peacebuilding. The claim that economic development will fix this 
eventually involves sacrificing lives in post-conflict spaces to an economic theory of 
neoliberalism that since 2007 has indubitably affirmed its propensity to collapse, ensure 
massive inequality of distribution and destroy lives and livelihoods. Persisting solely with such 
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an unstable and dangerous approach which, even when it does work, can take years to 
‘trickle-down’, reveals an arrogant and egregious lack of consideration for people in whose 
name peacebuilders exist. Interventionists often neglect the hardships of the everyday 
because they rarely see them for any length of time and almost never experience them. 
Waiting for a ‘trickle-down wealth’ effect is not a solution to immediate needs. Understanding 
‘the everyday’ in extreme post-conflict spaces as a reaction to chronic personal insecurity, as 
well as to a range of other contingencies, illuminates the importance of ‘the everyday’. It may 
be considered self-actualizing human security as encapsulated by Michel Foucault’s 
‘technologies of the self’.16 Darby notes this understanding of security and the ways and 
means of the everyday when he writes that ‘the most promising approach [to peacebuilding 
may] be anchored in the concept of self-securing…. Self-securing unsettles the understanding 
that security is best handled from “above”’ in the liberal tradition of security from the 
perspective of the State.17 This representation of ‘the everyday’ destabilizes the priorities 
placed around post-conflict security, paving the way for local people to identify and discern 
how they define security and insecurity. This reveals security as subjective, reminding 
peacebuilders that, in the extreme conditions of post-conflict spaces, people are normally 
‘uninsured’, to use Mark Duffield’s conceptualization.18 Vulnerable people will necessarily 
prioritize solutions to poverty, joblessness and poor health above liberal institutionalization 
located in a distant, and disconnected, metropolis. 
The ‘everyday’ is used here to refer to and illustrate the myriad socially-sanctioned 
ways in which, to secure their being, people outsmart their environmental limitations and 
manage the gaps between constraints and aspirations in the face of inadequate, disinterested 
and incompetent authority and power. It refers to the ways people make their lives the best 
they can, manipulating with whatever tools and tactics at their disposal, the surrounding 
natural, social, economic and political structures, local and global, that empower or constrain 
their lives. In the vandalized environment of post-conflict spaces, the everyday is biopolitical 
resilience: the application of ‘silent technologies [which] determine or short-circuit institutional 
stage directions [and] the popular procedures [that] manipulate the mechanisms of discipline 
and conform to them only in order to evade them’.19 We may think of this as the manipulation 
of disempowering and asymmetrical power. It is in this sense an indigenous biopolitical 
response to exogenous biopolitical intervention. ‘Everyday life’ is immanent, imminent, 
ingrained and legitimated as a routine for populations in very poor and post-conflict spaces. It 
finds expression in informal activities from selling out-of-date aspirins outside refugee camps 
to police bribing motorists, and survival mechanisms, from children taking food from people in 
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outdoor restaurants to scavenging on rubbish tips. It is the routines of life that empower 
people to manage their existences to the best of their abilities without reference to formal 
regulation of the private sphere by the biopolitical state. 
 
Mechanisms of ‘The Everyday’ 
 
Development and anthropology scholars have long understood the role of such practices in 
compensating for resource shortages, practised formally and informally among people who 
rely on them for everyday survival and basic nutritional-physiological needs.20 Such 
transactions routinely involve subsistence living and tend to be relatively small scale, in 
contrast with elite larceny, which is normally much larger in scale and less widely 
redistributive. Schmuel Eisenstadt and Luis Roniger call such small-scale transactions 
‘generalized exchange’.21  
Vicky Randall and Robin Theobald also note that in the societies in which such forms 
of social behaviour are legitimatized and routine, people ‘often live at the margin of 
subsistence’ and ‘not infrequently, [they] are driven below this margin by the vicissitudes of 
their existence: flood, drought, diseases, sickness, death, violence and intimidation by 
outsiders’.22 Family and kin may provide vital sustenance in a process sometimes referred to 
as ‘informal welfare’, and these exchanges and gifts will often be reciprocal and loosely 
equivalent. Where the family or local community cannot or will not intervene to ameliorate 
such conditions, however, and when the state and the market do not provide welfare, 
vulnerable people often turn to a more powerful individual such as their landlord, or a village 
chief, or a wealthy business person. Such relationships involve ‘an exchange between a 
superior patron or patron group and an inferior client or client group [in which] the low-status 
client will receive material assistance in one form or another whilst his patron will receive less 
tangible resources such as deference, esteem, loyalty [or] personal services’.23 Daniel 
Ogbaharya refers to these practices as ‘the social norms, customs, and networks that allocate 
and manage the economic and environmental resources of communities’ at sub-state 
levels.24 They may involve low-level state employees, from underpaid police extracting ‘fines’ 
from motorists to medical staff operating taxis instead of attending clinics where they may not 
be paid for months. They often involve local people exchanging goods and services in a more 
or less equal fashion as well as involving unequal relationships between stronger and weaker 
individuals. Necessity, practicality and legitimacy are common themes in the mechanisms of 
‘the everyday’ that can be referred to as Common Social Exchange (CSE). The normality of 
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such relationships is represented in slang, demonstrating their pervasiveness. In Cambodia, 
the term khsae, or ‘strings’, denotes the winding connective networks of essential sustenance 
and loyalty. 
Despite their legitimacy and necessity, CSE is commonly dismissed for the challenge it 
represents to the formal economy and its institutions. Visualizing and understanding the 
importance and function of these mechanisms throw the relevance and consequence of 
orthodox priorities into sharp relief, contrasting the necessity and legitimacy of the former with 
the privileged incongruity of the latter. Peacebuilding does not cater for the everyday, 
imminent needs of millions of people. This is central to understanding how and why people 
may not view prevailing peacebuilding priorities as legitimate. 
‘The everyday’, when elaborated and displayed, presents a gateway for rethinking the 
priorities of peacebuilding around values shared among peacebuilders and people in war-torn 
societies. Maintenance and enhancement of ‘the everyday’ provides an alternative focus for 
the development of legitimacy, which in turn underpins stability and thence local peace. There 
can be no international liberal peace without national, local peace. Whereas orthodox 
peacebuilding has lacked attention to ‘the everyday’, critics have demonstrated conceptual 
awareness but have not evolved methods and policies for realizing the potency of their vision. 
From both perspectives ‘the everyday’ may represent an opportunity to refocus peacebuilding 
in ways that address the lacunae in legitimacy, sustain the development of local peace, and 
theoretically support the peace more broadly. It would be a more popular peace.  
 
Popular Peace and Liberal Peacebuilding 
 
If this better describes ‘the everyday’ and illuminates the matters of immediacy, relevance and 
legitimacy for people, how might international interventions respond? First, the routines of ‘the 
everyday’ can act as a guide to social and economic needs and the legitimacy of the 
institutions and practices sustaining them, in contrast with prevailing, and failing, priorities in 
liberal peacebuilding. Second, ‘the everyday’ acts as a focal point for the organization and 
mobilization of effective state delivery of public needs. It is a guide to the areas of private life 
that the public sector and the sentient state can serve and thereby legitimate themselves. In 
short, being able to better ‘see’ and comprehend ‘the everyday’ focuses the rationale of the 
re/forming state around (heterogeneous) popular will, endorsing the state’s democratic and 
liberal credentials (in the sense of having a social contract) to which public loyalty could bond. 
Third, mobilizing state provision around peaceful, popular preferences identified with 
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democratic instruments attuned to the variety of popular needs could make peacebuilding 
more responsive, participatory and emancipatory. In listening to and hearing diverse groups 
within a population, the state honours the will of the people and liberates liberal peacekeeping 
from the confines of its discourse and nomenclature, and the frailties of the peace it 
privileges. The outcome of acknowledging, hearing and responding to everyday lives is 
‘popular peace’. It is more than basic needs provision. It is the democratization of 
peacebuilding by making it genuinely participatory, such that the popular will of society 
determines the nature of the peace to be built, whatever that might be, as long as it peacefully 
reflects the electorate’s will.   
This is not the same as solely indigenous peacebuilding, at the opposite end of the 
spectrum to the hegemonic model. The debate between orthodox and critical schools turns on 
the balance between international and local determinism. Neither works well on its own, but 
they do not have to. The intellectual divide implies to some that orthodox and critical schools 
are mutually exclusive.25 On the contrary, the former shows signs of recognizing the merit of 
local legitimacy debates to be found in the latter.26 And critics consider various aspects of 
liberal ideology invaluable;27 but not the elements that relegate millions behind a limited 
peace for a limited minority, that are exclusive of substantial groups of people, or that support 
participation in and ownership of little more than political nomenclature and technical 
processes and a propensity for form over function. Thus, although critical scholarship 
‘recognizes the dangers of hegemony and of ignoring the basic needs of individuals in 
societies in favour of governments, states and elites’,28 it does not preclude a role for 
liberalism in postconflict peacebuilding. Instead, critics imagine a peace that might ‘offer 
empathy and care… contribute to a social contract, recognize cultural dynamics, offer 
everyday resources, and rest on a responsive social contract between local societies and the 
international peacebuilders, which might eventually make it self-sustaining’.29  
But, as Roland Paris points out, critical scholarship does not go much further than 
these imaginings.30 Where orthodox peacebuilding scholarship has shown itself uncritical and 
unwilling to engage with the everyday, critical peacebuilding has been willing but unable to 
advance working alternatives to the existing orthodoxy (as opposed to abstract thinking). A 
viable alternative bridging the two schools of thought would have to satisfy core aspects of the 
prevailing liberal hegemony and top-down emphases on ideology and elitism, whilst 
simultaneously advancing bottom-up methods concerned with the mass of ordinary people’s 
lives. Can this happen? Whilst the values underpinning a belief in the essentialism of 
liberalism to long-term planning privileging markets and institutions do not centre the 
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everyday and the imminent, they are not the only emphases of liberal peacebuilding. 
Liberalism and liberal peacebuilding involve a host of other values and objectives that mesh 
well with ‘the everyday’ and with critical peacebuilding preferences. A revised expression of 
liberalism to foster genuinely participatory and inclusive legitimacy, democracy and human 
rights for political development could satisfy elements of critique and the more pressing 
concerns and priorities of ‘the everyday’. For example, a revised liberal peacebuilding could 
centre on the right to life and the right to water, both enshrined in various international 
covenants but considered only rhetorically for the developing world, as a starting point in 
peacebuilding engagement with post-conflict spaces and everyday lives. There is no more 
central right than the right to life; without this right being supported by all the actors 
responsible for determining who gets what, all other rights are meaningless.31 The limited 
scholarship that has surveyed everyday priorities in post-conflict spaces identifies a 
preference for shelter, clean water and sanitation, electricity and jobs.32 The evidence 
suggests that such needs are, in the immediacy of the post-conflict moment, more important 
to local people than restored courts sustaining abstract rights in distant capitals. The 
expression and realization of such public preferences are underpinned by key liberal values 
like participation, the social contract and political stability. While serving everyday needs, 
these practices simultaneously extend core liberal values and objectives.  
How can stable state–society relations be achieved? These are technical matters and 
matters of political expression and international political economy. Water for instance, is easy 
enough to clean with cheap technologies, and basic education encourages safe treatment of 
water and waste. But the decision to prioritize it is distinctly political and economic; they 
cannot readily be separated at either the local or the global level. For example, various global 
institutions such as the World Bank refuse to support state welfare, arguing that such matters 
should be left to markets and non-state provision by charities and churches. The scale of 
intervention required to get post-conflict societies to a position where they can contemplate 
growth exceeds residual capacity, and transnational corporations are disinclined to engage in 
high-risk, low-return investment such as rural sanitation – even though safe water and 
sanitation are central to life. Such political and economic decisions exert power over life and 
are thus clearly biopolitical. The impact of local and global political economy priorities is 
routinely experienced in everyday life as ongoing poverty, vulnerability and the persistent 
sense that the state is disinterested in the population’s immediate and most pressing 
priorities. This translates into a lack of relevance and legitimacy of institutions prioritized in 
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statebuilding, and it misses an opportunity to engender the legitimacy missing from most 
international interventions. 
These are matters of ideology and economic ontology and epistemology, but they are 
not insurmountable. In terms of political economy, one element of such a strategy could 
involve extending the existing institutional emphasis of liberal peacebuilding to national bodies 
concerned with everyday life and its priorities. For example, a revised form of peacebuilding 
could emphasise a national health infrastructure focused around whichever health needs are 
most pressing for the greatest number, following the historical European example.33 The 
emphasis is still state-centric and Weberian-orientated. But instead of prioritizing the kind of 
state institutions focused on a limited metropolitan minority such as courts of law, 
bureaucracies concerned with traffic rules, constabulary regulations relating to the wearing of 
various uniforms and drivers’ licences and MoTs, or enforcing the rule of (liberal) law that 
disadvantages millions of poor landowners,34 the focus would be on those preferences 
identified by substantial majorities across a country, where normally most people live. Rural 
priorities will likely vary considerably from liberal preferences often confined to metropolitan 
areas. Everyday needs could be served and local legitimacy bolstered on the way to 
generating the kind of trust between state and society that lies at the heart of the social 
contract, upon which durable peace rests. This also draws on the notion of democracy 
emphasized in the prevailing approach, but renders it more meaningful. That is, rather than 
prioritizing elections that offer short term representation by corrupt elites who manipulate and 
pervert the process before, during and after elections, peacebuilding priorities might respond 
to collective needs with substantial and long-term institution-building that reflected the 
priorities of the electorate. This would both honour public will and deepen the relevance and 
legitimacy of this emphasis on democratic participation and inclusivity. It represents an 
opportunity to serve both local and global peace with a shift in emphasis on institutions, 
formal and informal, from those that privilege metropolitan minorities and international 
business to those that provide for peaceful priorities of the wider electorate. Metropolitan 
minorities (mainly elites and middle classes) are enabled by liberal peacebuilding – rather 
than the poor urban majority swollen by rural migrants whose former spaces are reduced and 
reclassified by urban spread and the remainder of the rural population.35   
A process of more democratized and inclusive peacebuilding will of course be 
‘corrupted’ as people adapt it to their everyday lives where it does not fit, and a definitively 
‘liberal’ outcome is unlikely, were it the intention of international peacebuilders; but no more or 
less than the existing, failing approach, and western democracies are not bastions of 
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propriety. For critics who suggest that such a proposition is Utopian, change begins with ideas 
and arguments, and it is better that than propagating a clearly dystopian model. Given the 
failure of the prevailing model and the tendency to repeat mistakes, apparent in Angola, 
Mozambique, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Namibia, Somalia, Uganda, Eritrea and 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, amongst many others, the time for examining alternatives is 
overdue.  
To connect citizenry to a state, the public preferences of the former must be provided 
by the latter. But state capacity in post-conflict spaces is normally severely compromised by a 
combination of incapacity, underfunding and corruption. How can these be managed, with the 
objective of democratizing, legitimizing and disciplining the state in relation to the society over 
which it presides? I suggest that the existing mission and assumptions of peacebuilding are 
not changed conceptually but are instead redirected to focus on funding and monitoring state 
bodies that serve everyday lives, just as peacebuilding presently does with elite political 
institutions. Global governance institutions such as the World Health Organization (WHO) and 
World Bank could protect core liberal rights underpinning everyday priorities through state 
institutions such as a National Health Service, vital public utilities or nation-wide schooling. 
These could be monitored and conditioned through various disciplinary mechanisms such as 
international NGOs (Physicians for Human Rights, Transparency International) and lending 
regimes (International Monetary Fund, aid agencies) in the same way that metropolitan 
government is presently. This would sustain democratically- and peacefully-enunciated 
priorities and render the process relevant and legitimate to the society represented and 
served by the state. Because it is the population at large that offers or withholds state 
legitimacy, it is towards their needs that the balance of provision must evolve. This will mean 
shifting emphasis from political institution building serving ideals to institutions that serve 
societies’ needs, releasing resources from the former to the latter and generating imminent 
legitimacy and authority. Once this has been established and a social contract stabilized, 
emphasis may shift to the longer-term political institution building that presently occupies 
centre ground in peacebuilding interventions. The institutions of global governance are 
essential to achieving this objective. 
 
The Role of Global Governance 
 
Global governance, the ideology and instruments that project liberal values globally, 
specifically to post-conflict spaces,36 encompasses opinion forgers such as Francis 
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Fukuyama and the late Samuel Huntington, scholars, international organizations such as the 
UN and EU, private transnational actors such as Avocats sans Fontières, Human Rights First 
and Freedom House, small local charities and other bodies such as the Anti-Corruption 
Commission in Sierra Leone and the High Office of Oversight and Anti-Corruption in 
Afghanistan. The significance of liberal hegemony, and its obvious biopolitical ramifications (in 
that everyday life en masse is directly affected by the policies it prescribes and proscribes), is 
central to the positioning of global governance in this article.  
Global governance possesses the potential for enabling a range of institutions to 
reduce the consequences of exposure to some of the most serious contingencies of everyday 
life in post-conflict spaces. In this sense, the potential for a more meaningful, representative, 
legitimate and democratic peace is enabled or constrained by the degree to which global 
structures favour or neglect popular priorities in peacebuilding interventions. Global 
governance institutions are already engaged in providing various technical commodities, and 
have at least three contributions to make to a popular peace that also sustains various liberal 
values and security interests in both North and South 
The first contribution by global governance institutions would involve responding to 
everyday needs enunciated locally and democratically expressed. This might include, for 
example, the WHO and Western development charities which might facilitate water, sanitation 
and hygiene where it is identified by local people as a priority. Other international institutions 
can be matched to national, peaceful, prevailing priorities through state infrastructures, such 
as the International Labour Office and World Bank facilitating a Ministry of Employment and 
Chambers of Commerce to identify local labour needs and capacities. The UN Development 
Programme’s Crisis Prevention and Recovery Report (2008) indicates that national health 
and transport infrastructure projects could help soak up unemployment and foster economic 
growth.37 The national institutions in question could be evolved in parallel with those 
metropolitan counterparts ordinarily prioritized in liberal peacebuilding but which neglect 
everyday life, and, in the process, fail to develop enough local legitimacy to secure the peace.  
A second task of global governance would be to ensure states and other appropriately-
focused agencies deliver what people have identified efficiently. ‘Good governance’ is 
presently funded in accordance with global governance values and audited, rewarded and/or 
punished for meeting various Weberian benchmarks of provision. The same mechanism 
applies here to other state institutions whose priorities focus on delivery for popular needs. 
There are various ways this might be achieved. Rewards could be offered for achieving 
objectives evaluated by local people using, for example, Most Significant Change indicators 
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(as used by international development agencies since early experiments in Bangladesh in 
1996).38 Another way might be to tie the provision of political institution-building in 
metropolitan centres to the successful establishment of broader-reaching practices that 
inclusively serve diverse popular preferences. Membership of important global covenants 
might also be tied to encouraging elites to broaden their remit to formalize and institutionalize 
care for vulnerable populations. In other words, in addition to privileging wider peace outside 
the capitals, global governance bodies concerned with traditional institution-building could use 
their disciplinary and punitive powers to condition elite politics towards social protection. This 
would respond not just to local needs and enhance peacebuilding, but would also confront the 
‘unbecoming’ nature of liberalism reflected in its disdain for basic human rights honoured in 
the West.39 For example, it is illegal for water providers in the UK to cut off non-paying 
customers because it is a breach of a fundamental right, but water and sanitation where it is 
often lethally scarce forms no part of the liberal covenant with post-conflict spaces. It is hard 
not to call this hypocritical.   
Thus, rather than excessive liberal authority determining what local people get, ‘just 
enough’ global governance responds to local demands and simultaneously delivers and 
disciplines state provision for democratically-determined needs. It is at this nexus, between 
the local and ‘just enough’ global governance, that popular peace resides and local legitimacy 
is fostered. A shift of this kind would nourish the provision of legitimacy and help to provide 
much needed internal stability. In this transversal, or horizontal popular peace (contrasting 
with the vertical, elite version), the successful execution of practices aimed at managing 
population contingencies will likely confer legitimacy on the institutions that provide for the 
population. Whether those institutions are rural or metropolitan, informal or formal, or a 
mixture of all, if they serve the needs of substantial population sectors, as opposed to a 
narrow elite, their relevance will likely render them legitimate, and they may be empowered by 
external support and moderated and disciplined through conditionality if violence emerges. In 
short, there are alternative compositions of peace that global governance could mobilize and 
sustain. Affirming everyday lives could direct global governance, comprising an enormous 
range of liberally-minded transnational initiatives with power over life. But how are these 
needs to be communicated democratically?  
 
Democratizing Liberal Peacebuilding: Making ‘Participation’ Participatory 
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It was suggested above that the technical manifestation of elite ‘change’ through elections 
serves to disguise the lack of change regarding the political economy of everyday needs, 
while others have remarked that liberal hubris masks the lack of substantial change amongst 
elites.40 The failure of this technical form of democracy to manifest popular will can be 
countermanded by rendering democracy more ‘political’. Peacebuilding favours the technical 
whilst the political life is relegated or ignored, a point made by Jens Sorenson and David 
Chandler, among others.41 The former is far easier than the latter. Politicizing democracy – 
managing power and inequality more representatively – may be achieved by making 
representation more than just an election that authorizes a centralized elite without creating a 
process for its legitimation. It is one thing to enable participation through a technically-
managed mass plebiscite. It is altogether another to empower people to have their democratic 
will realized through a representative and meaningful social contract. The state part of the 
contract is achieved through elections; the social does not follow in liberal peacebuilding, 
mainly because liberal peacebuilding does not engage with the needs of the broad population 
and ‘the everyday’. 
Achieving the technical has been the objective of top-down external liberal 
interventionists and their associated methods. ‘Achieving the political’ is the aim of a more 
inclusive and horizontal process that requires different methods to identify the will of the 
people beyond their choice of leaders who rarely lead or represent.42 A first step in 
democratizing post-conflict peacebuilding and transforming the technical into the political 
involves hearing the preferences of the electorate beyond their momentary voting preference. 
Phillip Darby suggests that: 
 
It is increasingly apparent – if as yet insufficiently acted upon – that… this involves 
listening to and taking bearings from people outside what is usually understood to 
be the [technical] political process... In many situations, whether a peace can be 
made or maintained may depend more on these grounded, personalized 
understandings – experiential knowledge – than on the geopolitical calculations 
and theoretical postulates of those skilled in state-building and diplomatic 
negotiation.43 
 
For peacebuilding to be relevant, and therefore legitimate, the built peace must reflect the 
peaceful interests and preferences of the people, serving and reflecting the popular will. 
Knowledge of these cannot be generated externally and then imported into post-conflict 
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spaces; it stems from within, in a more genuinely democratic exercise. The realization of that 
will from without, through the state and from global patrons, will likely generate legitimacy and 
the grounds for a more equitable social contract.  
The means by which such preferences may be communicated are many and varied. 
Social communication networks long predate peacebuilding; people have mobilized to 
achieve their objectives in innumerable ways and places through ‘the everyday’. Physical and 
social infrastructures for communication exist as a matter of course and, where they have 
been broken by war, they may be readily rebuilt.44 There is no shortage of agency in most 
post-conflict spaces at grassroots levels through community and provincial based 
organizations, for example. There is no reason why their remit may not be expanded to a 
national level. Local representation could be communicated through digital bulletin boards. 
Community and provincial organizations could be equipped with laptops, generators and fuel, 
wirelessly networked, connecting people to the internet through mobile phone networks 
upgraded with amplifiers and boosters for regional reach. Even some slums have access to 
older computers and the internet. If there is no electricity in one area, the public will in a given 
area can be communicated by ‘motos’ (small motorcycles) or other locally-accessible 
communications. This process would support ‘civil society organisations that... promote real 
participation in decision-making – not “consultations” with the public that rubber stamp 
decisions made elsewhere, or [which] ignore public demands that do not fit into donors’ 
preconceived frameworks’.45 In short, people’s needs can readily be communicated, and it 
does not have to be based on advanced technology, although this may help. Whilst many 
Western donors favour working with elites, that preference can be challenged by pointing to 
the long run interventions that have failed to liberalize elite practices in any meaningful way.  
 
Conclusion  
 
There is broad agreement that liberal peacebuilding has failed to secure the kind of peace 
that travels internationally. Advocates insist that through elite institutionalization peacebuilding 
implants particular liberal values from the top down. Critics maintain that this does not 
happen, and that the approach fails to engage with popular needs, undermining the sources 
of political legitimacy that lie at the heart of stability and durability. The elite bias also acts as 
a comment on the extent to which liberal peacebuilding is meaningfully liberal, participatory or 
democratic. The two schools of thought may converge, however, around a synthesis of the 
global and the local that extends the priorities of both. Liberal institutions can still lead the 
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way, but they could serve the popular will before elite actors in the North and South. Critical 
research could better develop methods for identifying local priorities to which global 
governance could respond. The degree of relevance to everyday life of such institutions and 
priorities will likely determine the extent to which a population views them as legitimate and 
accepts the state. The concept and possible outcome can be labelled ‘popular peace’. 
Beginning with, and hearing, the everyday represents an opportunity to refocus 
orthodox peacebuilding in ways that address the existing lacuna in legitimacy, sustain the 
development of local peace, and theoretically support the liberal peace more broadly. This 
form of peace would be more genuinely representative, participatory and democratic than the 
prevailing model because it would emphasize institutional growth that serves the popular will 
and engenders a greater likelihood of loyalty than one in which institutions relegate or ignore 
public voices. It binds the everyday to legitimacy; it is a peace that is relevant, apposite and 
legitimate to a majority of everyday lives. It cannot be defined or determined by outsiders, but 
outsiders can at least act to remove some of the impediments to its realization. There is, in 
other words, no standardized blue-print for such a popular peace, since all everyday lived 
realities are influenced by an enormous range of social factors that differ from landscape to 
landscape. Peace is particular to context and messy in make-up, rather than formulaic, 
reactive rather than rigid, and can be better suited to spontaneous contingency, circumstance 
and complexity than the rehearsed rhetoric and ready rubric of orthodox peacebuilding and 
liberal ontology. For such a peace to be most effective, two agendas require consideration. 
The first is everyday need, the second liberal exceptionalism. The two are not necessarily 
mutually exclusive. Ultimately, popular peace could be ‘emancipatory’ not just for people in 
post-conflict spaces, but also for the liberal project, morally distressed and devalued by the 
distance between what it preaches in human rights rhetoric, and the practices it privileges in 
reality. Popular peace might reinvigorate the legitimacy of how peacebuilding interventions 
happen and what they seek to achieve, and salve an ideology of peace in serious trouble in 
terms of what it claims it can do and how best to do it. This is not the purpose of a popular 
peace – which is more about rescuing people from excessive ideological dogma and what 
seems like blind faith in a misplaced idea. But if liberal global governance were seen to be 
responding to mass need expressed peacefully and democratically, its reputation in the global 
South and to its critics everywhere may be at least partly restored.  
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